Arte Visual: 24 ago 2020

Roger D`Mendoza

Is an open source tool to help you build a valid SSL certificate chain from the root certificate to the end-user certificate. Also can help you fix the incomplete certificate chain and download all missing CA certificates.

How To Use
It's simple:

# Clone this repository
git clone https://github.com/trimstray/sslmerge

# Go into the repository
cd sslmerge

# Install
./setup.sh install

# Run the app
sslmerge -i /data/certs -o /data/certs/chain.crt

symlink to bin/sslmerge is placed in /usr/local/bin
man page is placed in /usr/local/man/man8

Parameters
Provides the following options:

  Usage:
    sslmerge <option|long-option>

  Examples:
    sslmerge --in Root.crt --in Intermediate1.crt --in Server.crt --out bundle_chain_certs.crt
    sslmerge --in /tmp/certs --out bundle_chain_certs.crt --with-root
    sslmerge -i Server.crt -o bundle_chain_certs.crt

  Options:
        --help        show this message
        --debug       displays information on the screen (debug mode)
    -i, --in          add certificates to merge (certificate file, multiple files or directory with ssl certificates)
    -o, --out         saves the result (chain) to file
        --with-root   add root certificate to the certificate chain

How it works
Let's start with ssllabs certificate chain. They are delivered together with the sslmerge and can be found in the example/ssllabs.com directory which additionally contains the all directory (containing all the certificates needed to assemble the chain) and the server_certificate directory (containing only the server certificate).
The correct chain for the ssllabs.com domain (the result of the openssl command):

Certificate chain
 0 s:/C=US/ST=California/L=Redwood City/O=Qualys, Inc./CN=ssllabs.com
   i:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms/OU=(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only/CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1K
 1 s:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms/OU=(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only/CN=Entrust Certification Authority - L1K
   i:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms/OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only/CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2
 2 s:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms/OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only/CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2
   i:/C=US/O=Entrust, Inc./OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference/OU=(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc./CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority

The above code presents a full chain consisting of:

Identity Certificate (Server Certificate)
issued for ssllabs.com by Entrust Certification Authority - L1K
Intermediate Certificate
issued for Entrust Certification Authority - L1K by Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2
Intermediate Certificate
issued for Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2 by Entrust Root Certification Authority
Root Certificate (Self-Signed Certificate)
issued for Entrust Root Certification Authority by Entrust Root Certification Authority

Scenario 1
In this scenario, we will chain all delivered certificates. Example of running the tool:

Scenario 2
In this scenario, we only use the server certificate and use it to retrieve the remaining required certificates. Then, as above, we will combine all the provided certificates. Example of running the tool:

Certificate chain
In order to create a valid chain, you must provide the tool with all the necessary certificates. It will be:

Server Certificate
Intermediate CAs and Root CAs

This is very important because without it you will not be able to determine the beginning and end of the chain.
However, if you look inside the generated chain after generating with sslmerge, you will not find the root certificate there. Why?
Because self-signed root certificates need not/should not be included in web server configuration. They serve no purpose (clients will always ignore them) and they incur a slight performance (latency) penalty because they increase the size of the SSL handshake.
If you want to add a root certificate to the certificate chain, call the utility with the --with-root parameter.

Certification Paths
Sslmerge allows use of two certification paths:

Output comments
When generating the chain of certificates, sslmerge displays comments with information about certificates, including any errors.
Here is a list of all possibilities:

not found identity (end-user, server) certificate
The message is displayed in the absence of a server certificate that is the beginning of the chain. This is a unique case because in this situation the sslmerge ends its operation displaying only this information. The server certificate is the only certificate required to correctly create a chain. Without this certificate, the correct chain will not be created.

found correct identity (end-user, server) certificate
The reverse situation here - message displayed when a valid server certificate is found.

not found first intermediate certificate
This message appears when the first of the two intermediate certificates is not found. This information does not explicitly specify the absence of a second intermediate certificate and on the other hand it allows to determine whether the intermediate certificate to which the server certificate was signed exists. Additionally, it can be displayed if the second intermediate certificate has been delivered.

not found second intermediate certificate
Similar to the above, however, it concerns the second intermediate certificate. However, it is possible to create the chain correctly using the second certification path, e.g. using the first intermediate certificate and replacing the second with the main certificate.

one or more intermediate certificate not found
This message means that one or all of the required intermediate certificates are missing and displayed in the absence of the root certificate.

found 'n' correct intermediate certificate(s)
This message indicates the number of valid intermediate certificates.

not found correct root certificate
The lack of the root certificate is treated as a warning. Of course, when configuring certificates on the server side, it is not recommended to attach a root certificate, but if you create it with the sslmerge, it treats the chain as incomplete displaying information about the incorrect creation of the chain.

an empty CN field was found in one of the certificates
This message does not inform about the error and about the lack of the CN field what can happen with some certificates (look at example/google.com). Common Name field identifies the host name associated with the certificate. There is no requirement in RFC3280 for an Issuer DN to have a CN. Most CAs do include a CN in the Issuer DN, but some don't, such as this Equifax CA.

Requirements
Sslmerge uses external utilities to be installed before running:

openssl

Other

Contributing
See this.

Project architecture
See this.

Download Sslmerge

More information

Roger D`Mendoza

Webinar en Vivo:
Habilidades de liderazgo para el desarrollo de un entorno organizacional favorable.

Curso en línea - Webinar Interactivo – Jueves 10 de Septiembre- Horario de 10:00 a 17:00 Hrs.

Este curso está dirigido para todos los líderes de las organizaciones que deseen realmente generar un impacto positivo en sus equipos de trabajo. La intención principal del evento no es llenar a los participantes de teoría, sino dotarlos de elementos prácticos que pueden aterrizar desde el día 1 en sus áreas de trabajo a fin de generar un ambiente más productivo, sinérgico y funcional.

Objetivos Específicos:

- Identificar el impacto del rol del líder en la cultura de trabajo de la empresa.
- Conocer los beneficios personales que puede brindar el desarrollar las habilidades de liderazgo personal.
- Entender y poder gestionar un proceso de comunicación a fin de elevar su impacto en situaciones uno a uno o uno a muchos.

Sensibilizaremos a los participantes sobre la influencia e impacto de su posición de líder en el desarrollo de un entorno organizacional favorable, productivo y funcional, brindando herramientas clave para lograr este resultado.

Para mayor información, responder sobre este correo con la palabra Liderazgo + los siguientes datos:

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Roger D`Mendoza

What is the process of hacking or phases of hacking?
Hacking is broken up into six phases:The more you get close to all phases,the more stealth will be your attack.

1-Reconnaissance-This is the primary phase of hacking where hacker tries to collect as much as information as possible about the target.It includes identifying the target,domain name registration records of the target, mail server records,DNS records.The tools that are widely used in the process is NMAP,Hping,Maltego, and Google Dorks.

2-Scanning-This makes up the base of hacking! This is where planning for attack actually begins! The tools used in this process are Nessus,Nexpose,and NMAP. After reconnaissance the attacker scans the target for services running,open ports,firewall detection,finding out vulnerabilities,operating system detection.

3-Gaining Access-In this process the attacker executes the attack based on vulnerabilities which were identified during scanning! After the successful, he get access to the target network or enter in to the system.The primary tools that is used in this process is Metasploit.

4-Maintaining Access-It is the process where the hacker has already gained access in to a system. After gaining access the hacker, the hacker installs some backdoors in order to enter in to the system when he needs access in this owned system in future. Metasploit is the preffered toll in this process.

5-Clearning track or Covering track-To avoid getting traced and caught,hacker clears all the tracks by clearing all kinds of logs and deleted the uploaded backdoor and anything in this process related stuff which may later reflect his presence!

6-Reporting-Reporting is the last step of finishing the ethical hacking process.Here the Ethical Hacker compiles a report with his findings and the job that was done such as the tools used,the success rate,vulnerabilities found,and the exploit process.

More articles

Roger D`Mendoza

After presenting our work at Real World Crypto 2018 [1] and seeing the enormous press coverage, we want to get two things straight: 1. Most described weaknesses are only exploitable by the malicious server or by knowing a large secret number and thereby the protocols are still very secure (what we wrote in the paper but some newspapers did not adopt) and 2. we see ways to enhance the WhatsApp protocol without breaking its features.

We are of course very happy that our research reached so many people and even though IT security and cryptography are often hard to understand for outsiders, Andy Greenberg [2], Patrick Beuth [3] and other journalists [4,5,6,7,8] wrote articles that were understandable on the one hand and very accurate and precise on the other hand. In contrast to this, we also saw some inaccurate articles [9,10] that fanned fear and greatly diverged in their description from what we wrote in our paper. We expected this from the boulevard press in Germany and therefore asked them to stick to the facts when they were contacting us. But none of the worst two articles' [9,10] authors contacted us in advance. Since our aim was never to blame any application or protocol but rather we wanted to encourage the developers to enhance the protocols, it contradicts our aim that WhatsApp and Signal are partially declared attackable by "anyone" "easily" [9,10].

Against this background, we understand Moxie's vexation about certain headlines that were on the Internet in the last days [11]. However, we believe that the ones who understand the weaknesses, comprehend that only the malicious server can detectably make use of them (in WhatsApp) or the secret group ID needs to be obtained from a member (in Signal). As such, we want to make clear that our paper does not primarily focus on the description of weaknesses but presents a new approach for analyzing and evaluating the security of group instant messaging protocols. Further we propose measures to enhance the analyzed protocols. The description of the protocols' weaknesses is only one part of the evaluation of our analysis approach and thereby of the investigation of real world protocols. This is the scientific contribution of our paper. The practical contribution of the analyzed messengers, which is the communication confidentiality for billion users (in most cases), is great and should be noted. Therefore we believe that being Signal, WhatsApp, or Threema by applying encryption to all messages and consequently risking research with negative results is much better than being a messenger that does not encrypt group messages end-to-end at all. We do not want to blame messengers that are far less secure (read Moxie's post [11] if you are interested).

Finally we want note that applying security measures according to the ticket approach (as we call it in the paper [12]) to the invitation links would solve the issues that Facebook's security head mentioned in his reply [13] on our findings. To our knowledge, adding authenticity to group update messages would not affect invitation links: If no invitation link was generated for a group, group members should only accept joining users if they were added by an authentic group update message. As soon as a group invitation link was generated, all joining users would need to be accepted as new group members with the current design. However there are plenty ways how WhatsApp could use invitation links without endowing the server with the power to manage groups without the group admins' permission:
One approach would be generating the invitation links secretly and sharing them without the knowledge of the server. An invitation link could then contain a secret ticket for the group and the ID of the group. As soon as a user, who received the link, wants to join the group, she can request the server with the group ID to obtain all current group members. The secret ticket can now be sent to all existing group members encrypted such that the legitimate join can be verified.

Of course this would require engineering but the capability of WhatsApp, shipping drastic protocol updates, can be assumed since they applied end-to-end encryption in the first place.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5i38WlHfds
[2] https://www.wired.com/story/whatsapp-security-flaws-encryption-group-chats/
[3] http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/apps/whatsapp-gruppenchats-schwachstelle-im-verschluesselungs-protokoll-a-1187338.html
[4] http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/it-sicherheit-wie-fremde-sich-in-whatsapp-gruppenchats-einladen-koennen-1.3821656
[5] https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/10/security-researchers-flag-invite-bug-in-whatsapp-group-chats/
[6] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/01/10/whatsapp-bug-raises-questions-group-message-privacy/
[7] http://www.handelsblatt.com/technik/it-internet/verschluesselung-umgangen-forscher-finden-sicherheitsluecke-bei-whatsapp/20836518.html
[8] https://www.heise.de/security/meldung/WhatsApp-und-Signal-Forscher-beschreiben-Schwaechen-verschluesselter-Gruppenchats-3942046.html
[9] https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3024215/whatsapp-bug-lets-anyone-easily-infiltrate-private-group-chats
[10] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5257713/WhatsApp-security-flaw-lets-spy-private-chats.html
[11] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16117487
[12] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/713.pdf
[13] https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/951169036947107840

Further articles:
- Matthew Green's blog post: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/01/10/attack-of-the-week-group-messaging-in-whatsapp-and-signal/
- Schneier on Security: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/01/whatsapp_vulner.html
- Bild: http://www.bild.de/digital/smartphone-und-tablet/whatsapp/whatsapp-sicherheitsluecke-in-gruppenchats-54452080.bild.html
- Sun: https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5316110/new-whatsapp-bug-how-to-stay-safe/

Pages

lunes, 24 de agosto de 2020

Sslmerge - Tool To Help You Build A Valid SSL Certificate Chain From The Root Certificate To The End-User Certificate

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Habilidades de liderazgo - Curso en Vivo

PHASES OF HACKING

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Group Instant Messaging: Why Blaming Developers Is Not Fair But Enhancing The Protocols Would Be Appropriate

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